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Simulation of Cognitive Behaviour in Computer Games1
John P. Hansen, Leif Løvborg, and Jens Rasmussen
Risø National Laboratory
1. INTRODUCTION
Two important research topics of the CEC MOHAWC project are analysis of
cognitive performance in actual work context and experimental investigation
of selected cognitive features by means of complex, simulated work domains,
the so-called micro-worlds. Special efforts are made in the project to general-
ize in order secure cross-fertilization between the two lines of investigation.
To support this latter effort, development of taxonomies for work analysis
(Rasmussen et al. 1990) and for micro-worlds (Brehmer, 1990) is used to
serve as a kind of intellectual interface.
A third important issue of the Mohawc project is an attempt to develop
computer simulation models of cognitive functions in order to test the con-
sistency of the models derived from the field studies and the experiments in
micro-worlds.
The present paper presents for discussion one approach, among several
possible, to the development of such simulation models. It is mainly con-
cerned with the identification and modelling of cognitive strategies at the
various levels of human functioning in order to understand the complex in-
teraction of knowledge, rules and skills during a learning process.
The decision how to do something and then implement the decision in a
synchronized series of precisely timed limb movements is an important in-
gredient of the work carried out by many kinds of professionals, from dress-
makers to fighter-plane pilots. Since the early days of cybernetics and engi-
neering bionics (see, for example, Moore and Speak, 1966), relatively little
has been done to describe and understand how behavioral patterns not
having root in conscious reasoning are acquired through learning by experi-
ence. It was the aim of the empirical study reported to get hints and derive
hypotheses for generating an adaptive cognitive model of this kind of tasks.
Consequently, the model should not only describes stable cognitive pro-
cesses, but capture the changes during experience and skill acquisition.
It is our assumption that predicting the way a human agent will cope with
work situations is basically done by first delimiting the mental strategies
that can be used for what is needed and then examining the agent's prefer-
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2ences and cognitive resources to identify the likely strategy he or she will use
to get the work done. This means that in order to understand the possible
mental strategies, one has to start with an analysis of the work domain at
the various levels the human may interact with it. This kind of analysis has
been carried out for domains such as process control, emergency manage-
ment, library systems, etc., in terms of the means-end abstraction hierarchy
(Rasmussen, 1986a). However, the complexity of constraints and possible
strategies in such 'macro-worlds' makes it difficult to use them in well con-
trolled laboratory experiments, aimed at testing and verifying modelling
principles. Therefore we used a commercial video game called 'Gymnastics'
that represents a 'micro-world' of highly limited alternatives for actions,
where there is no difficulty in identifying the strategies players of the game
can apply, assuming that subjects exhibit the same basic adaptive develop-
ment in cognitive control, as one will find in more complex work domains.
2. THE APPROACH TO COGNITIVE SIMULATION MODELS.
One basic requirement for the simulation models in the present context is
compatibility with the conceptual framework applied for work analysis and
for experiments. This immediately point to models based on object-oriented
simulation languages which are well suited to represent the causal scenarios
and qualitative reasoning as found in description of work performance. The
prototypical nature of causal representation create special problems with the
representativeness of the behavioral trajectories generated by simulation;
while the causal models represent types of behavioral patterns, simulation
generates particulars. This topic has been discussed elsewhere (Rasmussen
et al, 1990).
According to the point of view underlying the structure of the taxonomy
for work analysis, human behavior in goal directed work can be represented
as being adaptation guided by subjective performance criteria and prefer-
ences within an envelope of constraints defined by the work requirements
and the cognitive resources of the individual. A matching approach in devel-
oping simulation models, therefore, is to take the starting point in a repre-
sentation of the work-given constraints and to design an adaptive mecha-
nism which is able to explore the boundaries of acceptable performance
guided by different performance criteria which can be varied so as to match
the type of behavior displayed by the model to that observed in correspond-
ing experimental scenarios with human actors. In this way, a simulation
model can be developed which is able to generate behavioral trajectories in a
representation of the work domain. The point is that a model of a particular
error-free human behavioral pattern is, in fact, only one of several possible
operational implications of the constraints on performance posed by the
work domain. Psychology enters the modeling first when meta-cognitive pro-
3cesses are included which represent self-evaluation of performance and the
choice, according to subjective value criteria, among the various acceptable
ways to cope with the requirements of the work domain.
There are, however, several issues to consider for the choice of simulation
strategy. One will be whether simulation should be focused on well-adapted
behavior in a familiar situation. In this case, the model will include several
sets of production-rules, each representing the action rules of a particular
coping strategy. Psychological traits will then only be represented in the
subjective performance criteria guiding choice of strategy, in the cue-utiliza-
tion heuristics and in the error mechanisms (see Rasmussen, 1986b).
Another approach will be to include the learning phase when the actor dis-
covers the rules of the trade and the cues guiding release of the action rules.
We will discuss this in more detail below, but first we will consider the basis
of simulation in terms of a separate representation of the work domain and
of an adaptive control mechanisms operating in this domain to meet some
specified goal.
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Figure 1. In a work situation or an experiment, an actor will read cues at different levels of
abstraction, i.e., sample directly invariant high level features relevant for cognitive control.
These cues influence action control at different levels.
2.1 The Field and the Actor
To test the consistency of a cognitive model we have to compare the perfor-
mance of the model when interacting with a 'work domain' with the perfor-
mance of subjects faced with the same domain. For the development of the
simulation framework, consequently, it will be advantageous to chose a do-
main which can supply a reasonable amount of experimental data. For this
4reason the model development will be made with reference to computer
games (Rasmussen, 1987).
The system to consider for experiments and the related simulation is il-
lustrated by figure 1. An actor, i.e., a cognitive system which can be modeled
at several levels of abstraction, is faced with a problem domain which, in the
same way, can be considered as a multi-layered system of means-ends rela-
tions. For design of experiments with subjects operating in a simulated envi-
ronment, it is important to consider which features of the domain behind the
experimental cover-story are included in the simulation, and how the
relationships to the actual simulation (computer system) environment are
perceived by the subject. Similarly, choices are to be made with respect to
the functions and mechanisms of the subject which are actually activated by
the experiment and the related instruction. An example of this relationship
is shown in figure 2 (for more detail, see Rasmussen et al., 1990).
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Figure 2. In the experimental setting shown, analysis is focused on identification of mental
strategies brought to action by agents for particular task requirements, such as situation
assessment, diagnosis, or planning. For such experiments, simulated tasks are frequently
used in the laboratory, mimicking in a controlled way a task known from normal work con-
text (electronic trouble shooting studied by means of computer generated networks of inter-
related nodes, medical diagnosis cases presented in paper-and-pencil representation, etc.).
In such experiments, the instruction is frequently phrased with reference to an actual task
and professional subjects are used for the experiments.
3. THE GYMNASTICS S VIDEO GAME AS A WORK DOMAIN
Before the simulation model approach is discussed in detail, we will have a
look at the Gymnast Girl Game and some of the most important result from
the experiments.
Figure 3 shows a picture from the work scenario of the ‘Gymnastics’ game.
The timing skill needed in order to master the game reasonably well is
quite extensive. First of all the player must learn to let the gymnast perform
5a good offset from the floor by pressing the joystick button approximately
400 ms after it was initially released. If the button is pressed too late (after
500 ms) or too early (before 200 ms), the gymnast will miss the springboard
and come to a halt. The next thing to be learned is to straighten up the
gymnast and land her on her feet by pulling the joystick back. This action,
required after roughly 4000 ms, is timed by carefully watching the gymnast's
terminal orbit and angle. The somersault maneuver presupposes that the
player pushes the joystick forward before the gymnast has left the horse be-
hind her. As long as the joystick is pushed forward, she remains in the full-
tuck position required for fast rotation. However, her rotational speed will
not be fast enough unless the player has made a preceding, precisely timed
button press to push her off from the horse in the right moment. This mo-
ment occurs when the gymnast is in a nearly vertical position over the
horse, approximately 1700 ms into the game, and it has a duration of about
100 ms only. Ability to comply with this timing demand is a prerequisite for
becoming a performer of somersaults.
The Gymnastics game provides a real-time dynamic task, which may serve
as a useful tool for studying learning of complex motor skills. The game has
a high ecological validity and offers a good and instant visual feedback.
Everything on the screen is almost exactly as most people have seen it in
TV-transmissions of gymnastics. The player is, therefore, immediately at-
tuned to the challenges of the situation. The interface has several well de-
signed cue-action relations: the posture; speed and height of the gymnast at
critical moments of the jumping clearly signal to the player that now he
should interfere to initiate an action and he will immediately see the conse-
quences of his actions. Furthermore, the spatial operations of the joystick
has an isomorphic relation to actual body movements: "push button to
jump"; "go left or right to twist"; "push button for pushing off the horse";
"move forward to curve the gymnast's body"; "pull back to make her upright
when falling forwards"; etc. So the way the joystick must be operated to pro-
duce an action has an intuitive connection to real athletic striving.
6Figure 3: The game runs on a Commodore-64, and it presents the player with the task of
getting a gymnast to make a graceful vault over a horse. Striving for a successful triple som-
ersault in the Gymnastics game is the way to get a scoring of ten points, but great timing
skill is then required to get the gymnast landed upright on her feet. If she falls, the reward
obtained by performing a difficult maneuver is more than lost due to poor execution. By not
attempting to make somersaults, the player reduces his risk of crash-landing the gymnast,
but the maximum score can get is now reduced to eight points.
For all of these reasons, the naturalistic screen setting immediately makes it
clear to new players what this game is about and the experimenter does not
need to invent a "cover story." The common use of cover stories in cognitive
experiments can be problematic for two reasons: (1) in order to make analog-
ical reasoning in novel problem situations, the player must recall details
from the cover story, which may be difficult to remember. (2) the cover story
can be misinterpreted or under-specified from the very beginning and make
the player form wrong analogies out of experimental control. (Brehmer,
Leplat & Rasmussen, 1987)
3.1 Event Space of the Game
The computer automatically reacts to an attempted action dependent on the
player's timing (note the narrow time constrains indicated on the time axis of
figure 4) and gives the related visual feedback as output. In between those
automatic decision nodes, the player has the opportunity to synchronize his
action attempts. This is not to say, that the player consciously intends and
plans an action on-line. Most often, the intensive visual attention demanded
during the five seconds a vault lasts, forces the player to choose between the
action alternatives before releasing the joystick button to let the gymnast go.
This is in accordance with the generally accepted conception that skill-
demanding acts are pre-selected subroutines that run off automatically, and
that feedback from the environment while a skill is performed mostly serves
7synchronization and coordination purposes (Robb, 1972; Rasmussen, 1986;
Colley and Beech, 1989).
By this way of representing the task, we are able to distinguish between
two major problems to be solved during training from a control point of view:
(1)the synchronization of actions with the behavior of the environment and
(2) the optimization of actions to form a smooth and efficient pattern within
the boundary of the task (Rasmussen, 1986).
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Figure 4: The event space of the “Gymnastics” video game. It is not a traditional flow chart
description of the game rules because it contains two kinds of decision nodes, pertaining,
respectively, to the player's and the computer's decisions. The diagram also contains nodes
that indicate at what stages of the game the player receives a distinctive visual feed-back
signal.
83.2 A Means-End Analysis of the Gymnastics Game
The general work domain taxonomy in terms of a means-end hierarchy sug-
gested by Rasmussen (1986), makes it possible to describe the various levels
of tasks in the 'micro world' of the game (Table 1).
At the highest level of abstraction, the intended functional effect of the sys-
tem upon it's environment is described. For the game designer, the goal is to
create an interesting game, that people will buy. This is done by offering a
system, that appeals to basic human feelings of joy involved in having fun,
scoring points, competing with other
players and learning the mastery of a
graceful task.
At the level of priority measures, these
goals are described in terms of the
information processing embedded in the
program as the games scoring rules.
There are hints about some of these rules
in the instruction manual, for instance
"release the button to start your run."
Without experience its impossible to
implement these abstract descriptions all
at once, because the player lacks the
necessary skills to get to the point where
he e.g. would be able to get the girl in the
air. At its best, the manual will serve as a
catalyst for the discovery of new action
possibilities during the skill acquisition
and as an initial instruction for getting
started. At its worst it will confuse and
frustrate the player to be confronted with
all those un-achievable action
possibilities. So in practice, the player
pays little or no attention to the rules as a
whole, but takes the relevant rule into ac-
count when he has realized it's practical
implications. For this reason, we provided
the subjects in our experiment with a planned sequence of successive
instructions, in order to hold the experimental control of the various sub
goals to be pursued. Most of the effective rules are not described in the
manuals, so the researcher must explore the taxonomy at this level through
statistical analysis of recorded game data or software analyzes before he can
give a full description as the one in figure 4.
The level of generalized function is where the “hidden” scoring rules show
up in the effect of the functions you choose. The language is that of a gym-
Value systems 
and structures
General functions
Physical 
form
Physiological 
functions
Learn 
Have fun 
Score points 
Competition 
Task Mastery
Playing the game in terms 
of jump, rotate, land, etc.
Joystick movement in 
terms of left, foreward, 
button press, etc.
Hardware 
(Screen, stick, computer)
Abstract function, 
priority measures
The "hidden" rules of 
the game,  i.e. priority 
criteria.
Table 1. A means-end description of
the Gymnastics game as a work do-
main.
9nastics performance. Operating the joystick is expressed in terms of “jump
onto the springboard”, “push off the horse”, “make somersaults”, etc.
Performance is described numerically by a score and qualitatively by words
such as “good offset”, “unsuccessful landing”, etc.
The level of physical function describes the interaction with the computer
by joystick manipulation to control a stored program, whose main function
is to move pixel patterns from one part of the screen to another. The player
perceives a realistic screen animation with a moving object under his con-
trol. The control language is “left”, “forward”, “press button”, etc.
The level of physical form describes the physical reality of the work do-
main, which in this case is the computer equipment. The player is only in
active contact with the joystick and color monitor, and when he is attuned to
the basic features of the equipment, the user need not concern  himself with
this level, as long as they do not cause problems at the level of physical
function, (for instance when a warn down joystick becomes insensitive to
button presses).
4. APPROACHES TO THE MODELING OF COGNITIVE TASK
PERFORMANCE.
Several different levels of modeling the mechanisms of a human agent can
be chosen. The right box in figure 5 shows how some of the typical concepts
for modeling cognitive processes can be described within a means-end ab-
straction hierarchy. The selection is only illustrative and their origins are
found in Anderson (1980), McClelland & Rummelthart (1987) and
Rasmussen (1986).
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Figure 5: The human - work domain interaction in the Gymnastics game experiment.
Detailed descriptions of human information processing involved in a task
like the Gymnastics game should take all the various task levels and the
related forms of interaction into account, because of the possible decompo-
sition and aggregating of information between the levels. (Rasmussen, 1986).
This detailed description is particular needed if the modeling is based on
single levels, in order to insure, that important information aggregated or
decomposed from other levels, will be taken into account in the model.
In the present approach we have focused on modeling human behavior at
the level of information processing strategies, with no emphasis on the ar-
chitecture of the underlying neural or psychological mechanisms.
Consequently, the cognitive system which is to be represented in a simula-
tion model is of the nature as shown in figure 6 . This model can, in fact, be
viewed as a hierarchically structured, self-organizing control system.
The bottom layer represents the adaptive, continuous control of move-
ments. The next higher layer, the sequence controller which organizes ele-
mentary movement patterns into meaningful action sequences by means of
cue-action correlations. Finally, the uppermost level takes care of plan for-
mulation in unfamiliar situations by means of mental simulation supported
by a mental model. One important feature which facilitates the development
of a simulation model is, that during learning of rules and evolution of
manual skill, new patterns of cognitive control are not necessarily generated
by complex, cognitive transformation and compilation of higher level control
structures. Instead, new effective control structures can be generated by
empirical search and optimization while behavior is kept "on track" by
higher level control. When new heuristics are identified and found accept-
1
1
able, older, higher level control patterns may then degenerate. This point of
view can be implemented in a cognitive model based on the kind search,
test, and optimization mechanisms of a self-organizing control system which
were widely studied during the 60s and which are now being taken up by
the neural network and connectionist approaches.
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Figure 6 illustrates the different levels of cognitive control in a model in terms of a self-orga-
nizing, adaptive controller.
4.1 An Example of the Interaction between Skill- Rule- and Knowledge
Based Cognitive Control.
Figure 7, which is a simplified version of fig.6, illustrates a possible interac-
tion of the skill- rule- and knowledge-based control in a hypothetical prob-
lem situation from the Gymnastics game experiment. A medium-trained
subject is trying to perform a double somersault. Suppose he masters the
1
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landing sequence for one rotation, but two rotations makes the girl crash
land. He knows that in order to get an upright landing he needs to pull the
joystick back a few hundred milliseconds before floor contact. But two som-
ersaults do not give time enough to execute this sequence. He has also no-
ticed, that a push-off from the horse just when the gymnast has passed a
vertical position gives an additional jumping height. He then realizes that
this additional high is a prerequisite for making a perfect triple somersault.
The model describes how this functional reasoning takes form and how a
useful strategy is implemented at the various levels of cognitive control.
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Figure 7: The dynamic interaction of skill-, rule-, and knowledge based control in an action
problem from the Gymnastics game. The numbers refers to explanation given in the text.
As a sensory input, the visual feedback from the previous play (1) is recog-
nized as a crash-landing (2). Making a functional reasoning process, he
identifies the reason for this: the girl did not get sufficient push-off power to
perform a triple somersault if the timing constrains of the landing sequence
has to be met (3). The overall goal (4) - to strive for maximum score - states
that a triple somersault has to be performed. Consequently, he needs more
time to make somersaults and uses the knowledge of the importance of the
push-off timing for obtaining height, derived from his previous experiences.
He then decides (5) to try to push her off just when she has passed a vertical
hand stand. The plan (6) is then (in a very simplified version) to maintain the
previous synchronization and timing, except for the push off timing, where
he intends to play close attention to her position on the horse, in order to
push her of at the right moment.
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This plan is stored as a new rule for the synchronization of actions (7) in a
control language like "If the girl has passed the vertical position then press
button." At the next jump, this rule might wait in the synchronized sequence
of actions plans to be activated when the sensory input gives a sign of a
vertical position (8). But this cue-action strategy is not very likely to be
effective, because the conscious rule-based control takes too long time to be
executed successfully within the narrow time constrains.
Based on empirical observations from eye-mark recordings, we shall argue
that the rule can be compiled through practice to a binary reaction task at
the level of automated sensorimotor control, working as a signal-action loop
(9). This is possible, because eye fixations in perception-action loops can
control the alignment of objects in target positions (Gibson, 1979). Through
this there is an activation of a low-level, unconscious action repertoire that
formally can be described as: "look at places that demand timed operations,
and execute planned operations when object enters central visual field." So,
when the new plan gets compiled to a skill-based level, it might be in a form
of:
1: Execute jump with previous synchronization and timing until a sign of
the girl having contact with the horse arrives.
2: At arrival sign, look at target position and alert signal— action repertoire.
3: When object aligned in target position, press button.
4: Continue jump with previous synchronization and timing until the girl
has landed successfully.
The control language of the process, as it might be tapped from e.g. verbal
protocols, will be very restricted compared to the complexity of the actual
process. The following examples are constructed with the inspiration from
typical verbalizations during some of our experiments.
Identification:
"..…it did not work, she did not get high enough ...."
Planning:
".... I will have to push her off when she is vertical...."
Stored rule for task:
".... now I really have to concentrate at the position on the horse"
And when the girl gets contact with the horse during the following jump:
"....Ready....." (Meaning: On the target position and alerting the signal-ac-
tion-loop).
"Go !" (Meaning: The binary decision "to press" is taken by the signal-action
loop).
Now when we have roughly delimited the type of mental strategies that
can be used for interacting with the work domain of the Gymnastics game
we will describe the experiments currently being conducted at our labora-
tory.
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5. EXPERIMENTS
We added code to the game program to log the joystick moves and the
resulting updates of the program's various score counters. Detecting that
the joystick was pushed forward is taken as an indication that the player at-
tempted to make somersaults, and the rotation score tells whether or not he
managed to perform the maneuver. In the extended version of the program,
logging data from blocks of single games are written onto the Commodore's
floppy disk. A game block consists of sixteen accomplished vaults plus the
unsuccessful jumping attempts made by the player.
5.1 Unaided Learning by Doing
In an early pilot experiment, two subjects played more than 1500 plays
each, without getting any instructions or cues to support the learning
process (Westrenen, 1989). Summarizing the main results, the expected
improvement in score and timing performance did not occur as strongly as
one would expect from the power law of practice (see, e.g. Newell &
Rosenbloom, 1981), although there were slow and small improvements. They
happened throughout the experiment, and no point of significant
improvement could be identified from various statistical analysis. The
variance remained high, except for one of the subject's timing, which showed
a constantly decreasing variance. These results indicate, that without
instructions, performance tends to change randomly, reflecting an
unstructured exploration of the event space in figure 4. Colley (1989) puts
forward, that learning by doing might be used successfully with movements
which requires balance and postural adjustment, for example learning to
ride bicycles or to roller skate:
"it is unlikely that this method would, on its own, be very successful for
skills which have a procedural component, such as driving a car and learning
a musical instrument," she says. (1989, p.181).
Our experiments certainly suggest, that this also is the case for even simple
computer games as Gymnastics, where considerable procedural components
are revealed by formal analyzes, c.f. figure 4. This might explain the vast
communication often found in groups of children playing video games
(Turkle, 1984) as the exchange of procedural knowledge necessary for task
improvements.
5.2 Eye-Mark-Recordings
In a second experiment eye movements of 3 subjects playing the video game
at succeeding levels of expertise were recorded to highlight the importance of
the development of scanning strategies. These seem to be more static than
the changing hand movement strategies, as they mainly reflect the pursuit
of the object to be controlled. However, small changes in scanning strategies
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bear witness of the development of a dynamic task model as a discovery of
crucial control and feedback points. Especially the occurrence of eye move-
ment being ahead of the target movement reveals the formation of a mental
task model. These asynchronous movements can be divided into three cate-
gories according to their functions in control terms. One category consists of
fixations on feedback points for feed forward actions. By another category
the players impose a forward period which supports the delicate timing of
movement sequences by shortening the players' overall reaction time, com-
patible with the effect of the well known starting procedures in sport: "Ready
- On your (in our case eye-) marks —Go!" (c. f. Robb, 1972). The last cate-
gory of asynchronous movements consists of fixations that anticipate events
in a monotonous sequence in which the player cannot interfere.
5.3 Group Experiment
This experiment was carried out with a school class made up of 13 girls and
10 boys, all of age 15 to 16. It was performed over a period of one week
using two Commodore units placed in an empty class room. The idea behind
the experiment was to train these teenager subjects collectively in acquiring
the motor skill demanded to play the Gymnastics game well and to provide
them with an opportunity to demonstrate their final skills in striving for
score.
The training program was composed of four game sessions of increasing
difficulty. In each session the subjects were requested to accomplish four
game blocks, all to be performed as described in a short written instruction.
The main purpose of the first two sessions was to let the subjects gain ex-
perience with the timing required to make a good takeoff from the spring-
board and to get the gymnast landed safely in an upright position. In the
third session the subjects were faced with the more difficult task of learning
to push off from the horse at the right moment. The last session consisted in
trying to master double or triple somersaults without crash-landing the
gymnast. Most of the subjects learned to perform the uncomplicated vaults
exercised in sessions 1 and 2. There were quite a few who never managed
the timing needed to make a powerful horse push; these subjects were
consequently disabled from utilizing the subsequently implemented full-tuck
position for fast rotation.
On the last day of the experiment, after the training program had been
completed, the subjects were asked to produce four additional game blocks
which they were encouraged to play according to their own individual prefer-
ences. Furthermore, they should regard the fourth block as a test game in
which they should aim at getting the highest possible average scoring.
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6. HINTS FOR COGNITIVE MODELING FROM THE EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS
In order give some hints for cognitive modeling some results from our exper-
iments will be presented in addition to those already mentioned.
6.1 Features of Physiological Functions
Optimization:
Figure 8 shows the improvements in takeoff-time learning of a subject from
the instructed group experiment within the first 86 trials. The time con-
strains of the task is indicated by the two thick vertical lines at 200 and 500
ms. In order make a good jump onto the springboard, the takeoff must be
executed after 320 ms (dotted line), and maximum takeoff power is not ob-
tained unless the offset from the floor is made after some 450 ms. The op-
timization of takeoff is quite rapid, from approximately 50 trials on sees a
majority of takeoffs within the good range. Then, in a few attempt, the sub-
ject fails to takeoff before 500 ms (e.g. trials 49, 66, 77 and 82). This has a
dramatic effect on takeoff-time in the following jump, which is hastened
before the good range.
Some subjects in the experiment optimized their takeoff time by first de-
creasing it to avoid being too late in hitting the springboard. Then, as they
became able to reduce the fluctuations in their timing, they gradually in-
creased their takeoff times towards the optimum limit of about 450 ms.
Figure 8:The improvements in takeoff-time learning of subject 1 from the instructed group
experiment.
In addition to the optimizations found in the motor skills, a typical percep-
tual optimization can bee seen in figure 9.
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Figure 9: The bar graph shows the time sequence of fixations (at more than 100 ms) from
two eye—mark-recordings of the same subject at a beginner level (trial number 5) and at a
medium trained level (trial number 352).
While the first recording is characterized by many short fixations during the
hole jump, the subject showed a tendency to cluster his fixations around the
important control and feedback points when sufficiently trained. At the
beginner level, he followed the girl with his eyes from the very start of her
run towards the springboard, which can be seen on the right side of the fig-
ure, where the fixation-bars are imposed on the eye movements. At trial 352
he immediately looks at the point of offset and wait there until the signal-
action loop is activated by the girl entering the central visual field, as de-
scribed earlier. Then he gets a feedback on his offset by fixating at the place
where the girl hits the springboard. The next important improvement in at-
tention allocation is found in the (rather short) fixation at the girls legs, right
above the horse. This fixation is used to support the timing of the push off
by a precise judgment of her vertical position and it is not found at the
beginner level.
Interference:
In order to investigate the interference between the various subtasks that
had to be learned during the group experiment, we examined the frequency
of successful takeoffs, twists, push-offs and landings through the whole ex-
periment. First the subjects had to learn the mastery of takeoffs and land-
ings, then the twists, then the push-offs and finally the rotations. An inter-
ference index (II) was constructed by looking for U-shaped learning curves in
the data blocks for the performance at each of the days the subjects had to
learn a new sub task. The focus on changes in each of the learning sessions
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was made in order to exclude the possible changes in performance between
the days, due to the interruption of practice (causing a fall in performance),
or due to the communication of procedural knowledge between the subjects
outside the experimental setting, which might possibly have caused an in-
crease in performance. The minimum decrease in a performance to be
counted was set at 15 %, and this fall had to be followed by an increase of at
least 15%. By summing up the relative decrease as the average length of the
legs in the U-curves of successful attempts by the individual subjects, table
2 was constructed.
The table reveals several trends in the interference between the subtasks:
first of all, it can be seen, that the takeoffs and push-offs are carried out by
very robust competencies, which only shows a small sensitivity to the
learning of other skills ( 155 II and 170 II, respectively) in comparison to
twist and landing skills, which are fare more sensitive (465 II and 625 II, re-
spectively).
Learning to push off had a minor influence on the frequency of successful
landings (230 II), which is mainly due to the problems in controlling the
additional height obtained by a push off. The learning of rotations caused
problems in executing all of the previous learned competencies ( 785 II) but
mostly on twists and landings. One could have supposed, that push-offs
were more effected by rotations (which actually had an II = 170) than twists
(which actually had an II = 320), since they are more close related in the ac-
tion sequence than twists and landings are. But the results indicate, that
interference is not only caused by closeness in the action sequence. When
the same motor system is used for executing a time critical task, this may
cause an interference phenomena, even though execution is separated by
other motor operations. So, in our experiment, joystick operations has to be
differentiated into button presses and limb movements of stick. A reasonable
explanation of this phenomena in terms of the skill- rule and knowledge-
paradigm might be, that when two rules call for the same action skill within
a short time, they are likely to interfere with each other. Generally speaking,
there must be a low-level distinction between the possible motor skills by
which a task is accomplished, in order to make a valid model of how simul-
taneous rules can cause interference in the physiological functions being
learned.
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e
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tion
Fine
Takeoff
- N=2,
M=45%
90
N=2,
M=27%
45
N=1,
M=20%
20 155
Twist - - N=4,
M=36%
145
N=9,
M=36%
320 465
Push off - - - N=7,
M=24%
170 170
Successful
landing
- N=3,
M=40%
120
N=8,
M=29%
230
N=10,
M=28%
275 625
Interferenc
e of
subtask
learning on
operations
- 210 420 785
Table 2: Interference matrix for subtasks in the Gymnastics game group experiment. N
refers to the number of subjects scored for an U-curve in the various groups. M is the mean
decrease of the scored U-curves.
6.2 The Inference of Rules and Selection of Possible Action Strategies
Considering the large amount of event experiences a subject gets by playing
the game, it seems implausible that he will be able to remember them all.
But on the other hand, he must remember some in order to make inference
on new action rules. What are then the economical memory principles for
experience selection?
One intuitively good strategy would be to remember those actions that
lead to an increase in performance. If the memory is biased for successful
attempts, the inference on these will be more likely to provide new effective
strategies. After the last session of the group experiment, where subjects
had to compete for the highest average score, we asked them to estimate
what average score they had obtained. 9 of the 23 subjects made a
considerable overestimation while the rest came quite close to their actual
score. This gives a total average estimation at 5.94 while the actually total
average score was 5.22.
Instead of rejecting this result as an example of subjects being ostenta-
tious, we analyzed the eye mark recordings of a subject playing 240 games
to find further evidence of a success bias. He turned out to be very restricted
in his attention to the obtained score shown after each jump. The average of
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the scores he paid attention to were 5.11 while the average of all 240 jumps
was 4.00. This selective perception may be understood as another manifes-
tation of a general cognitive principle of functional bias for success, if one
accepts the widespread conception that mental models directs active look-
ing, (See e.g. Stark & Ellis, 1981).
The subjects in the group experiment had to fill out a questionnaire after
each training session, asking questions about the general functions of the
program, like: where should the girl land on the springboard to make a good
jump ? Overall, they made quite good inferences from their experiences,
providing them with useful cue-action strategies. After the twist-learning
session, the subjects where asked: "when is the right time to push the joy-
stick to the right side or to the left side if you want the girl to make a twist?"
The most effective strategy is to do this before the girl hits the springboard
and keep it there while the girl is in the air, because this insures that the
narrow timing constrains can be met within a longer executing time.
Approximately half of the subjects thought that the best time was at the very
takeoff or immediately after. One should have suspected this group to show
a much lower performance than the group with the right conception. But
this was not the case. It means, that the wrong cue-action rule did not
govern action performance during the play, and must have been rationalized
after the session when they had to give an answer to a question never
considered before. Generally speaking, this indicates that some actions
might be effectively learned without the support of a correct and conscious
rule. In such cases, the subjects explanations of his cue-action strategies
given in e.g. interviews or verbal protocols can be misleading. Therefore task
analysis has to be supported with a careful examination of the actual task
performance and an independent analysis of the domain constrains.
6.3 The Impact of Instructions
The effect of tutorial instructions can be seen as systematic changes in the
attempted movement sequences of the subjects in the group experiment, in
contrast to random changes in the two unaided learning series. When the
subjects were told about the possibility of making e.g. the twist, almost all of
them attempted to do so in a majority of the following jumps. Typically, only
50 % of the attempts succeeded in the beginning. By continuing to attempt
the sub goal suggested by the instructions, most of the subjects were able to
achieve a level of 100 % success within the same learning session for the
easy tasks. The more difficult tasks like push off and rotation, were also
attempted whit great enthusiasm in the beginning. But some of the subjects
did not make any significant improvements and typically this lead to a de-
crease in the number of attempts. This points at an important effect of in-
structions, besides the direct cues it often gives: by knowing, that a task is
possible, a new sub goal is implemented for a while, waiting to be achieved
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by the development of the necessary skills. If this does not happen within a
reasonable time, the goal seems to diminish and the number of attempts de-
creases.
6.4 The Impact of the Action Goals
On the last day of the group experiment, after the training program had
been completed, the subjects were asked to produce four additional game
blocks which they were encouraged to play according to their own individual
preferences. Furthermore, they should regard the fourth block as a test
game in which they should aim at getting the highest possible average
scoring. Hereby, we intended to change the specific goal of playing the game
from "learning" to "demonstrating ability."
From the recordings of the joystick moves made by the subjects in this
latter, highly goal-oriented task, it was possible to divide the subjects into
three groups: (I) those who continually attempted to perform the somersault
maneuver; (II) those who had a preference for this maneuver without intend-
ing to perform it continually, and (III) those who rarely or never tried to
perform the maneuver. It is obvious to try to correlate this grouping accord-
ing to playing style with the grouping that results from looking into the
subjects' individual skill to actually obtain rotation scoring. The data
recorded in training session 4, and in the three game blocks preceding the
final testing block, suggest the following division of the subjects into three
skill categories: (A) those who were highly or reasonably capable of produc-
ing well executed double and triple somersaults; (B) those who performed
similarly except that they most often crash-landed the gymnast, and (C)
those who were unable to get the push off power necessary for fast rotation.
The result of classifying the subjects according to playing style in the test
game on the one hand and skill from training on the other is shown in Table
3 (girls) and Table 4 (boys).
Playing-style (I) represents great insistence to try to obtain a reward by at-
tempting to perform a difficult task. Nine subjects exhibited this behavior.
However, only four of the subjects possessed the skill needed to implement
their ambition (group I-A). Two subjects consistently preferred the difficult
task alternative without having the necessary competence to successfully
execute the task (group I-B). There were, finally, three subjects who, despite
the test situation, happily went on trying to perform a task they did not
learn to manage in the preceding training program (group I-C). The ten sub-
jects who resorted to playing-style II seem to have developed a fair under-
standing of the fact that it may be unprofitable to invariably stick to the
most challenging way of coping with a task, even if one is a competent per-
former like the single subject in group II-A. Only four subjects did
apparently decide, as suggested by their choice of playing style III, to
completely renounce the potential reward from going for difficulty. These
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subjects (groups III-B and III-C) evidently realized that their skill in
performing the somersault maneuver was poor and used this knowledge to
select the less risky strategy for playing the test game. Note that group III-A
is empty. Skilled players do not resort to trivial performance!
Learning
Playing-Style
Contest Playing-Style Category
Category I II III
A 4 1 0
B 2 6 3
C 3 3 1
Table 3: Double classification of the 23 teenagers who participated in a gymnast game
experiment. Due to the change of action goal, 4 subjects chose a more simple strategy
(groups II-A and III-B) and 8 subjects tried to play a style they had not mastered before
(groups I-B, I-C and II-C).
Though the experimental evidence presented above is very limited, we have a
clear example of distinctively varying user preferences which are not directly
related to actual personal competencies acquired through learning, but seem
to be strongly conditioned by the context defined by a specific goal setting.
The moment the context changes from a training situation to a task situa-
tion containing action alternatives, psychological and metacognitive mech-
anisms that were not active previously may become strongly behavior- con-
trolling factors. This is an example of how process at the highest level of the
means-end hierarchy, namely the goal-settings influences the choice of
strategies.
7. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS.
Table 4 lists the major empirical findings in our experiments so far.
Structured within the means - end - hierarchy the findings relates to differ-
ent levels of the skill learning process. The observations in our experiments
have implications for the planning of simulation experiments, performed, for
example, with a learning machine that has been programmed to adapt its
behavior to an environment guided by training of the kind the teenagers
were provided with in the Gymnastics game. Without building models of the
mechanisms and phenomena reported into the learning machine, the latter
will not permit reliable, predictive simulations of the way human beings uti-
lize their skill and knowledge.
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Value systems 
and structures
Abstract function
General functions
Physical 
form
Physiological 
functions
Possible action strategies might be 
inferred and selected from  
experience  by a functional bias 
for successes.
Not relevant
A specific goal setting within the 
same work domain has an over- 
all impact on decisions made by 
the subject.
Subgoals provided by instruc- 
tions are taken into account in  
the subjects attempts, but if they 
are not reached within a reaso- 
nable time,  their importance on 
performance tend to diminish.
 
Optimization during experience 
might be reactions to error signals 
and reduction of fluctuations. 
 
Negative interference might be  
found among simultaneous optima-
zations.    
 
Timing can be supported by anti- 
cipating eye movements on control
points.
Table 4: The major empirical findings in our experiments.
8. OUTLINE FOR A COGNITIVE SIMULATION MODEL
With the inspiration from the empirical results reported we will return to the
theoretical considerations on cognitive simulation models presented in
paragraph 2 and 4.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, we consider object-oriented simulated
languages to be well suited for presenting the causal scenarios and qualita-
tive reasoning. The basic idea is to let a model agent (MA) form an object,
which is to explore the causal scenario (CS) of the Gymnastics game, repre-
sented by another object. Hereby, we establish a distinction between the
agent and the domain in which the agent has to discover the various pos-
sibilities for synchronization and optimizations. These two objects will be
implemented in two different processors, supplied with a third processor to
take care of the graphical representations and other external functions.
The following descriptions of features of the MA and CS are highly tenta-
tive, and reflects the premature and vague status of ideas, currently being
discussed at our laboratory.
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Figure 10: An overview of the timed causal scenario of the gymnastic game. (See appendix A
for a detailed description).
8.1 The Ccausal Scenario.
Figure 10, which is a timed process specification of the event-space in figure
4, gives a view of the causal scenario of the Gymnastic game to be imple-
mented in the computer model. (See appendix A for a detail description of
the individual process). The domain is highly clock-driven with time-slots
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found in each of the "Update timer" cycles . At certain points of time, the
computer asks whether a particular action has been executed, and on basis
of the answer, it provides distinctive visual feedback, which exclusively
characterize each of the action possibilities. This means, that an exhaustive
search of the event-tree can be based solely on the feedback provided.1
The clues included in the CS were selected with the support of the eye
mark recordings. All of them do, at the various levels of expertise, attract the
attention of the experimental subjects for a certain period, indicated by
fixations (at more than 100 ms). Some of the cues remains attended during
the hole training period, while others loses their attraction, as described in
section 5.3 and 6.1 of this paper.
As it can be seen, the hole causal scenario can be well described as 5 sub-
process, namely the entrance, the jump onto the springboard, the push off
from the horse, the air maneuvers and the landing. The outcome of a sub-
process are exported to the next sub-process as an updating of the values t 1
(takeoff time) and t 2 (push off time), which are included in the calculating of
the girls air maneuvers and the final calculating of the score.
The modeling of the girls air maneuvers in process 3 calls for a simulation
based on physical laws of the relation between achieved height, momentum,
angular momentum and body angle. These laws are well defined and cur-
rently being implemented. The visual output of the air maneuver simulation
is of a unique form, compared to the other well defined visual cues. We be-
lieve it to be an example off a compound, higher order invariant (Gibson,
1979), consisting of three sets of data, the height, the angular momentum
and the body angle, which affords crash landing, unstable landing or perfect
landing.
All though the causal scenario is not a 100% replica of the gymnastic
game yet, we think it holds the fundamental causal relations and the ap-
proximate time constrains of the original game, which makes it a sufficient
basis for the coming modeling attempts.
                                      
1 One basic problem in the simulation of a game player at the level of information
processing strategies is the representation of the "direct perception" of cues releasing rules
of action because these cues will be derived from global gestalts in the displayed patterns
representing the state of affairs in snap-shots of the game scenario. The problem can be
approached either by including a representation of a pattern classification and recognition
mechanism in the simulation model. This will be necessary in a model simulating the
subject in the fire-fighting game of Brehmer et al., (1990) and opens up the question of
similarity matching discussed by Reason , (1990). In the fire-fighting game, action scenarios
are related to types of forest fires which, in turn, are defined by complex spatio-temporal
visual gestalts which are not related to simple display control signals . Another approach
will be to start the model development from data collected from a game with a simple and
direct mapping of the state of the display elements onto the cue-rule level. Such a simple
mapping is found in the "gymnast game" in which cues for actions are related to well
defined states of stable objects, i.e., to the state of the stable object "girl" in a "jump" across
the stable object "horse".
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8.2 Features of the Model Agent.
As functional outputs, the MA posses three types of movements (MO):
1) No action.
2) Button push and button release
3) Joystick movements in eight directions, and movement to the central po-
sition.
On the last two MO’s there are some constrains, reflecting physiological
constrains derived from analysis of the experimental results.
1) Synchronization time (SC).
Between each action, there is a certain amount of time, in which no actions
can be carried out. The synchronization time represents the speed at which
motor actions can be combined in the real world. As it's minimum the syn-
chronization time has the shortest time the joystick can be moved from e.g..
south to north. This bar time will decrease towards minimum as a function
of the number of times an action has been carried out.
2) Reaction time (RC).
In addition to the synchronization time there is a reaction time (RC). This
will be defined as the time taken from the input of a visual feedback to the
opening of the possibility to execute a movement. Like the SC, the RC will
decrease towards a definite minimum as a function of the number of times
the MA have gone through a particular cue-action correlation.
3) Stochastic variation (SV).
There is a stochastic variation on the time precision by which a planned ac-
tion can be executed. This variation is decreased around the mean value of
the time of successfully actions ( that is: actions leading to the expected vi-
sual feedback).
Note, that the synchronization time described in 1) is subordinate to the
stochastic variation - the bar time is first effectuated when an action has
been executed.
4) Optimization mechanism (OM).
When the variation is reduced to a level where e.g. 90% of the trails falls
within the successful range, the single action times will be driven forward by
an increase of e.g. 5%. If this courses the action to fall outside the success-
ful range, the next trail is hastened 5% before the former action time, as a
reaction to the error signal, giving a decrease at 10% of the "punished" time
of action. Then the action times are driven forward with smaller steps, e.g.
3%. When it gets an error signal, it jumps back with 6%, forward again with
steps smaller steps (e.g. 2% increase) and so forth, until an optima have
been achieved. This "rude" optimization mechanism is implemented in order
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to provide the MA with capabilities of "boundary seeking" of the kind found
in our experiments, c.f. figure 8 in this paper.
Note, that the reduction of variability (3)) is independent of the optimiza-
tion mechanism. (This mechanism might only be plausible for button
presses and not for joystick movements).
8.3 Inference of Cue-Action Rules
With these constrains on its physiological output the MA is entering the
causal scenario in order to get experiences by which it can derive the rules
to govern its exploration of the scenario and apply different strategies and
performance criteria. For the first experiments and related model develop-
ments, within this paradigm, we will focus on representation at the rule-
based level. The skill-based level will, in computer games, very often be re-
lated to the basic interface manipulation skill, which (in particular with in-
terfaces based on keyboards and command languages) will be conceptually
foreign to the problem space of the game.
The cue-action rule sets is defined in a context given by the causal sce-
nario (Appendix A) and the perception of this context will, in turn, depend on
higher level cues. In consequence, the rule-based part of the model in figure
6 will have to extended in a way illustrated in figure 11 which stresses the
fact that rules and cues will be developed corresponding to the different
levels of means-ends relations of the problem space.
Figure 11 illustrates how the rule-based model operates at a higher level
than the elements of the display-control surface of a game.
An important precondition for a satisfactory solution to the representa-
tiveness problem touched on in the introduction, it will be necessary to
model how different strategies can be chosen for playing the game, which are
related to different derivatives of the primary goal of the game. As a primary
goal (1),we might e.g. want our model to perform in a contest situation like
the teenagers in the experiment, deriving that the MA should aim at a high
average score, or we might like it to be in a learning state, deriving (2) that it
should seek many top-scoring cases irrespective of a low average. In addi-
tion, the choice of strategies will be influenced by different subjective per-
formance criteria (e.g. fun of exploration, lack of commitment, etc.). In this
case, parameters of the model can be identified for manipulation to generate
a wide variety of trajectories which can be clustered around prototypical
strategies. A MA with great fun of exploration should e.g. give high priority to
an exhaustive search of the causal scenario and a low priority to scores
obtained. Then it will be interesting to compare their performance with clus-
ters obtained from different subjects and different phases of the experimen-
tal sessions. In this case, model parameters which correspond to features
used for judgment according to subjective performance criteria can be iden-
tified.
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When the set of goals have been chosen and the derived strategies have
been specified under the influence of performance criteria, a specific set of
functions can be intended (3). The cues provided by the scenario will deter-
mine what kind of actions to carry out. Suppose, that the MA is confronted
with the scenario for the very first time. What kind of cues does it provide for
actions ?
Work Environment
Retrieval (1)
Retrieval (2)
Retrieval (3)
Focus
Focus
Action Rule
Retrieval (4)
Movements
(Function Intended)
(Set of Goals Chosen)
Cue
Cue
Cue
Cue Configuration 
Controls Move- 
ment Pattern
Activates  Actions
Activates Strategy
Activates Goal 
Figure 11 illustrates how the rule-based level of figure 6 is extended for development of a
cognitive model which represents performance in a game which can activate different
strategies and performance criteria in different stages of learning and with different
individuals. The numbers refers to the examples given in the text.
We would claim, that the visual layout of the scene from the gymnastic
hall (see figure 3) directly specifies a temporary action goal ‘to get the girl
over the horse’. Then the AM will be given some basic action rules, which we
as human beings would have got either by analogical reasoning on our men-
tal model of horse jumps or by a direct perception of the affordancies in the
scenario. 2
                                      
2 The horse height is a direct specification of some additional power needed in order to
jump over the horse. This nessesity is given by the dimensionless ratio of the girls riser
height , (which we would know approximatly by a proportionate scaling of the scenario),
and the jumper´s leg length (Warren, 1984). This would lead us to seek for objects that
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Example of an initial action rule:
if (run, jump, horse contact) in list of visual feedback
then temporary action goal achieved.
This kind of action rule specification is a great challenge as it forces us to
be very precise in the construction of the rule set and in the inclusion of the
naive physic rules needed for novel rule generation.
At the lowest level of rule-based reasoning (4) the relation between actual
movements and achieved visual feedback will be established as a list of em-
pirical cue(visual feedback) - action (movements in terms of time t and type
(MO)) relations. This memory will have to be restricted if it is to be a plau-
sible model of human capabilities. Some of the limitations are being cap-
tured by the physiological constrains of the MA´s output, e.g. the lack of
precise knowledge of t due to its the stochastic variation . But the major
limitations are still to be specified. We shall only briefly mention some of the
limitations we are considering:
*A sequence of actions can gain status as a local movement chunk (LMC),
which is a motor chunk, releasing the burden of the MA's restricted memory,
because it can be executed by only one command to the synchronization
controller. In the domain of the gymnastic girl, a LMC can be defined as be-
ing separated in time and/or by a shift between button actions and joystick
movements.
Once a LMC has been established, it will only be able to unpack the LMC
by tolerating some temporary disturbance in the timing of the action se-
quences - the MA's struggle against a growing habit. It will be necessary to
unpack a LMC in order to implement a new action possibility that has been
discovered, either by inference or by a novel visual feedback coming up as a
result of a casual, stochastic driven action.
The formation of a LMC is an example on the evolution of a manual skill
that are not generated by complex, cognitive transformation and compilation
of higher level controls structures, c.f. the comments on figure 6 in this
paper.
Hopefully this constrain will be able to produce some of the interference
phenomena found in the experiments.
*The achieved score should not be remembered as list of specified actual
scores. It's more likely that the mean score value achieved for different sets
of LMC´s can be remembered.
*The MA will only have memory access to a certain amount of its latest
trails, unless the movement can be either closely linked to the arrival of a
visual feedback as a perception action loop working on display control sig-
nals or have been executed so often that it is embedded in a LMC.
                                                                                                                   
affords amplification of the girls kinetic energy, specifying that the running track and the
springboard should be applied.
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*Most of the visual feedback in the CS are pre-defined cues (e.g. "Jump in
the distance of zero to tree centimeters from entrance" given in process 1),
which in real world perception would have to bee detected as an distinctive
cue. While some of these cues can be detected at the very first time they are
seen (e.g. the twist in process 1), others are more subtle and might first bee
discovered after several confrontations. This constrain can be dealt with in
the administration of the MA's visual memory, operating with separate lists
of "cues seen" and "cues detected". Each of the cues seen might then be
given an individual value of their "visibility" which decides how many times
one cue has to be seen before it will be written onto the "Cues detected" list,
on basis of which, the MA may make inference to generate new action rules.
The empirical eye mark recordings can support the assessment of the visibil-
ity of a certain cue.
8.4 The Interface to the Simulator.
In order to make the simulation process cognitive transparent for its poten-
tial users, we are considering different ways to visualize the performance
and control structures of the MA, in addition to the representation of the
causal domain. Similar, the optional inputs to the MA, e.g. different
instructions provided, must be presented in a way which encourage free
exploration and experiments with the simulators functions. As mentioned,
we plan to let a third processor take care of all these communication
functions.
One way to visualize the MA´s discovery of the event-space (fig. 4) would
be to unfold the branches of the tree, when it gets experiences with the vari-
ous synchronization possibilities. Starting with one big “black-box”, the first
confrontations would e.g. unfold a visual feedback node for “stand in en-
trance”, “run”, “halt” etc. On this display of the MA´s current experiences,
the user might:
* see how often a particular action has been carried out by the MA, e.g.
the push-off frequency.
* click on a timing node to see the MA´s learning progress in e.g. takeoff-
time learning, in a format like fig.8 in this paper.
* open a window showing the joystick movements in a time-position dia-
gram of e.g. the latest 50 attempts in quick replay. This is very useful to get
a picture of the developments in the MA’s movement patterns, on basic of
which the LMC’s can be seen as invariants.
* click on pairs of timing nodes to see whether there is indications of in-
terference between the optimization process.
The inspection of the MA´s rule-structure might be done from a window
with a display like fig. 11 in this paper. By clicking at the various levels the
relevant structures might be seen as a hierarchical tree. This rule structure
will change considerably as the MA discovers new rules, and new goals or
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instructions might be given the MA by a direct manipulation of the rule
structure. Instructions in the form of procedural knowledge could have the
form of new action rules given at level 3 in a form like: Achieve visual
feedback (twist) at time (t = 90) This instruction might light up a new, not yet
achieved visual feedback node at the current event-space.
If the MA is put in a goal state of learning it will be prepared to take such
orders. If it is in a goal state of competition, this instruction might lead to a
conflict, as it courses a temporary decrease in the scoring. Conflicts between
e.g. primary goals and performance criteria could be detected as deriving in-
compatible action rules by a rule consistency checking.
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